Claims and Counter-Claims in the 'Moral Rights' Debate
Within Australia there has been agitation for the introduction of Moral Rights legislation for a number of years, however debate on this issue has recently been pulled more sharply into focus with the release of the Copyright Law Review Committee's Report on Moral Rights. Rather than confirming that there is an obvious need for the introduction of specific new legislation in this area, and contrary to the expectations of many Moral Rights advocates, the majority of the Committee held the view "that it is inappropriate to introduce legislation to protect moral rights at this time" (Report p. 10).
While this recommendation does seem to mark something of a setback for Moral Rights advocates, it should be noted that it is not based on any case made against the underlying principle of Moral Rights, but on what the majority perceived as the inadequate case made in favour of specific legislative change. As I will argue, the distinction between specific legislation and general principles is an important one, for despite the fact that there is a substantial body of material put forward in favour of Moral Rights, this is often weakened by a tendency on the part of advocates to argue from an essentialist position, assuming that Moral Rights are somehow naturally given and that the law in its present form is blind in its failure to recognise them. This fundamentally moral position is a major contributing factor in the continuing confusion on the part of authors and artists as to the exact nature of Moral Rights, and the relationship of these rights to Copyright provisions. Further, by arguing in general terms, the quite specific differences between various national Moral Rights laws... The rest of this article is available to subscribers of Eyeline
What are Moral Rights?
Richard Serra, Titled Arch, 1981. Federal Plaza, New York. Photo: Peter Anderson.
